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Abstract 
Corporate boards play an important role in shaping, steering, supervising and advising an or-
ganization. Thus it is likely that corporate boards have an impact on corporate performance. 
There is empirical literature which analyses the interrelation between board features and com-
pany performance. The results suggest that board characteristics have a measureable impact 
on the economic success of a firm.  
Although the two-tier system prevalent in “Continental European” countries significantly dif-
fers from the one-tier regime as it separates management and supervision of an organization, 
there is little research done by now to examine, whether results from one-tier regimes persist 
in this alternative setting. 
Previous empirical literature often does not discuss the underlying economic rationales in 
detail. But as this study is on effects in a formerly not empirically analyzed governance re-
gime, we seek to build a theoretical reasoning for the impact of supervisory boards on corpo-
rate performance. Based on this our empirical study explores the interrelations between su-
pervisory board characteristics and accounting as well as market based corporate performance 
by using a sample of German listed companies. We find that the average remuneration of su-
pervisory board members seems to have a positive association with firm performance. Addi-
tionally and in contrast to previous results in different governance settings we find that board 
size does not negatively. 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study seeks to examine theoretically and statistically interrelations between board cha-
racteristics and performance in large, publicly listed German corporations. Statistical results 
do not reveal the nature of their existence but past research has not always explained which 
forces drive the emergence of observed results. This is especially true for the potential impact 
of supervisory boards on performance as past research widely lacks for the German gover-
nance regime. Thus, in order to interpret statistical findings properly we also seek to establish 
a theoretical basis explaining potential interrelations between supervisory board characteris-
tics and performance. 
There is a vital and ongoing discussion whether good corporate governance can contribute to 
increase corporate performance. Several studies analyzed various questions in this context, 
albeit predominantly in the environment of highly developed capital markets such as the US 
or the UK. The system of corporate governance consists of several instruments or devices 
which are subject to country specific legislative policies. Although there are undisputed simi-
larities and analogies between governance regimes of different countries in terms of employed 
instruments or minimum standards, there still exist obvious differences. These differences on 
the one hand don’t allow for unconsidered transfer of insights obtained in one governance 
regime into another. On the other hand they establish a real-life experimental situation which 
enables researchers to observe how different regulatory settings may influence the whole sys-
tem of corporate governance. Both aspects make regulatory differences a fruitful environment 
for governance research. Germany is such an interesting object for governance studies as law 
amongst others prescribes a two-tier board system and as the whole governance regime can be 
considered as more stakeholder-oriented than the US or the UK. 
Governance instruments can be seen as incentive mechanisms which are set up to address, 
mitigate and solve conflicts of interest among different company stakeholders. Providing in-
centives for important protagonists involved in the business of a company on can expect these 
instruments to have an effect on corporate activities which in turn should reflect in overall 
corporate performance. Different specifics and characteristics in the design of governance 
instruments may differently interfere with corporate activity and success. Regulatory require-
ments might establish a minimum level of governance but companies seem to systematically 
exceed this level indicating that there are underlying economic rationales which influence 
corporate governance systems. 
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Corporate boards play an important role in shaping, steering, supervising and advising an or-
ganization. The Anglo-Saxon board of directors is a good example of an institution that incor-
porates all of the aforementioned functions. Besides others, its members decide on crucial 
business issues and staffing of important management positions. Thus it seems to be obvious 
that corporate boards should have an impact on corporate performance. The design and confi-
guration of corporate boards varies heavily between different legal regimes. Moreover even 
within one legal regime boards do not always look the same but differ in particular features 
such as size, structure, diligence or expertise. 
Existing literature mainly empirically addresses the question, whether board features drive 
company performance. The joint results provide evidence that board characteristics have a 
measureable impact on the economic success of a firm. However most of these studies focus 
on one-tier board regimes where the board of directors is the most important institution, which 
jointly controls and supervises the company. We doubt that results from one-tier regimes 
persist in different governance settings like the two-tier board system, prevalent in so called 
“Continental European” countries. A two-tier system separates management and supervision 
of an organization by assigning each task to another board. 
As mentioned this study entails a theoretical and a statistical part. The theoretical considera-
tions can be summarized as follows: Building on Hermalin/Weisbach (2003) we state that 
actions of corporate board members influence corporate activity which in turn is reflected in 
corporate performance. As we cannot systematically observe specific actions of directors, we 
have to rely on surrogates for these actions – board characteristics like incentives, structure, 
diligence and qualification usually serve as such surrogates. We further argue that the first 
order effect is rather from director actions to performance than vice versa. High quality boards 
are not overwhelmingly expensive to be only affordable for successful corporations. Charac-
teristics like board independence or structure are not likely to have been caused by foregone 
corporate success. Good past performance does not induce high quality directors to enter the 
board as their individual reputation should not mainly be based on past success but on their 
work in the boardroom which contributes to future corporate performance. To theoretically 
link today’s characteristics with today’s performance we rely on an equilibrium assumption. 
The theoretical section ends with a categorization of favorable board characteristics and ex-
planations how they might affect board activities. 
In our statistical part we want to detect measurable effects which show an impact of supervi-
sory boards on corporate performance. We use OLS regression technique and employ a sam-
ple consisting of 2006 and 2007 data for the 140 largest publicly listed German companies. 
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We find that monetary stimuli seem to provide strong incentives for outside directors to fulfill 
their duties properly which reflects in favorable company performance. We argue that this 
persistent effect across model specifications which is not likely to be due to reverse causality 
could be explained by a signaling function emerging from board compensation levels. Board 
size, which has been shown to systematically interact with corporate performance in one-tier 
board settings, and diligence do not seem to affect corporate performance in our sample. 
However the experience and expertise of a board significantly affects corporate performance. 
In line with results of recent studies busy directors as well as bank representatives seem to be 
negatively related with corporate success.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following: To the authors’ knowledge 
this is the first study which uses German capital market company data not having been widely 
accessible before 2006 and assesses interrelations between supervisory board characteristics 
and corporate performance. Germany is one of the major two-tier countries and studies in this 
environment might help to better understand the specifics of and interrelations within the two-
tier system in general. Additionally, the mandatory division between supervision and man-
agement Germany allows examining certain characteristics of supervision which could not 
have been captured before in studies within one-tier regimes.  
Besides employing novel data this study contributes to the literature as we seek to provide 
reasoning which adds to explaining the impact of governance mechanisms on corporate per-
formance. Previous literature frequently does not dwell on the potential transmission mechan-
isms between certain specifics being representative for good governance and corporate per-
formance. We particularly elaborate on the potential effects of outside director activity and 
hope to be able to widen the understanding of their influence on performance. This also con-
tributes to discussions on the issue of endogeneity between governance and performance. Sta-
tistically almost irresolvable without reservation (Larcker/Rusticus (2007)) we argue that va-
lid economic rationales have to be brought up and discussed which help to answer the ques-
tion of causality or might help to distinguish first-order from second-order effects. Our study 
seeks to set at least an impulse for vivid further discussion and research. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the specifics of German legal environment which are im-
portant for the understanding of this paper. Section 3 introduces the theoretical reasoning and 
also refers to previous literature. The empirical model as well as our hypotheses are developed 
in section 4 which is followed by the presentation and discussion of our empirical results in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Specifics of the German Corporate Governance Regime 
 
SEPARATION OF MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 
A unique characteristic of the German corporate governance regime is its two-tier board struc-
ture. Publicly listed and large limited liability companies are by law obliged to have separate 
institutions for managing and supervising the firm. For publicly listed firms these boards are 
the management board (“Vorstand”), which comprises the firms’ top executive directors who 
steer and control the corporate business, and the supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”), whose 
members have no direct executive power themselves but are supposed to monitor, supervise 
and consult the managing board. Thereby, the two-tier board system provides a strict institu-
tionalized separation between the company’s management and its monitors, leading to an en-
hanced organizational transparency. 
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Although both the management as well as the supervisory board jointly contribute to increas-
ing the value and success of the company, a direct consequence of the separation between 
them is that their roles and responsibilities differ. Executive directors, including the CEO, are 
members of the “Vorstand” and solely manage the firm by controlling and steering the com-
pany’s business. Active executive directors strictly are not allowed to serve on the supervisory 
board of the company they manage and vice versa. In consequence this regulatory require-
ment leads to a predefined organizational separation of the CEO and the chairman of the su-
pervisory board, albeit successful CEOs frequently become chairman of the supervisory board 
after having completed their tenure as CEO. 
The supervisory board is not empowered to directly involve itself in the management of the 
firm. Yet, it still can impose rules requiring its approval on a specific predefined set of major 
business decisions and activities, thus exercising indirect control over the management. 
Moreover, it appoints and dismisses the members of the management board including the 
CEO and conducts remuneration negotiations. Since 1998 the supervisory board is also ob-
liged to take the main role in cooperation with the external audit firm. It suggests an auditor to 
the general assembly, determines the focus of the audit and negotiates on audit fees. Its mem-
bers are important recipients of the audit report. Yet, in Germany the understanding of the 
supervisory board has changed over the last decade. Having been focused on monitoring the 
management board, it is now also seen as an advisor or consultant for the management who 
7 
 
does not only supervise but support the executive management in fulfilling its tasks and du-
ties. 
 
CODETERMINATION AND SIZE OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD 
Another specific of the German corporate governance regime is the concept of codetermina-
tion, which is an internationally unique setting. It can be seen as an organizational construct 
balancing the interests of company shareholders and employees. German corporate law re-
quires companies to include workforce or union representatives in the supervisory board, 
when a certain threshold is reached. The concept is of further interest for our analysis, as size 
and composition of the board are closely linked to codetermination as follows: Companies 
with 2.000 – 10.000 employees are obliged to have min. 12 supervisory board members. 
10.000 – 20.000 company employees set the board’s size to at least 16, and companies with 
more than 20.000 employees have to have a supervisory board with at least 20 members. Ac-
tually our data suggests that companies never exceed this prescribed minimum size. Half of 
the board’s members have to be either employee of the company or union functionary. Com-
panies who do not reach this threshold and are not codetermined have to have at least three 
members of the supervisory board or any other number divisible by three. 
To the authors’ knowledge, no other governance regime allows a comparably high participa-
tion of workforce representatives in supervising the management. [Historically, the develop-
ment of codetermination is a result of the significant influence and impact unions in Germany 
have had and still have on companies.] A reason for having employee representatives on the 
supervisory board is that they can serve as information carriers in two directions: from the 
supervisory board to the employees and vice versa. This helps, e.g., to prominently address 
workforce topics like remuneration, job cuts or labor conditions. One economic rationale for 
setting up this unusual form of “company democracy” is that the involvement of employees in 
fundamental company decisions might help motivating the workforce for a goal which is 
commonly accepted by all stakeholders.  
 
SUPERVISORY BOARD REMUNERATION 
The supervisory board’s remuneration in Germany is set by the general assembly. Board 
members often receive a solely fixed compensation. If variable compensation is granted, it is 
often linked to the company’s dividend payment. In contrast to the management board, mem-
bers of the supervisory board are not allowed to receive stock options as compensation com-
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ponent. Unionized employee representatives on the board have to pay their remuneration ex-
ceeding a certain base amount to a union trust. 
For a long time the remuneration of supervisory board members was rather a reimbursement 
of their opportunity costs than a compensation meant to induce proper and diligent work. Su-
pervisory board members received only a comparably small compensation in comparison to 
their executive colleagues. In the 90s supervisory board member compensation only slightly 
increased. However, this changed remarkably over this decade. Between 2003 and 2006, 
along with the increasing importance and prominence of corporate governance issues in Ger-
many, the salary of supervisory board members was raised significantly. In DAX30 boards’, 
e.g., total compensation increased by 23.5% on average each year (Towers Perrin 2004-2006). 
Albeit still being lower than executive director compensation, this increase represents a consi-
derable adjustment. 
2006 16% 
2005 17% 
2004 11% 
2003 50% 
Table 1: Increase of supervisory bard compensation 
Since 2005 German publicly listed companies are obliged to disclose personalized informa-
tion on the amount and structure of yearly remuneration of management board members. 
Along with this, most of the firms now also disclose the supervisory board members’ remune-
ration, so this data is also largely available since 2005. 
 
GERMAN STOCK MARKET 
The stock market in Germany is not as far developed as in the US or the UK. Table 2 shows 
market capitalization data for the world’s three largest stock exchanges and in comparison for 
the German stock exchange.1 
Stock Exchange Market capitalization in USD millions No. of listed companies 
NYSE Group 10 312 695 2 447 
NASDAQ 2 579 456 2 934 
London SE 2 042 145 3 156 
Deutsche Boerse 1 097 030 840 
Table 2: Development of supervisory bord compensation  
Source: World Federation of Exchanges, November 2008 Newsletter 
                                                 
1
 Data has been gathered after the world financial crisis already has begun in October 2008. 
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According to the Deutsches Aktienistitut 15.2 percent of the German population owns stocks 
or funds and the number of stockholders decreases (DAI 20082). Only 5.4 percent are direct 
shareholders. In the beginning of the millennium in the US 25.4 percent and in the UK 23 
percent of the population where direct shareholders (DAI 2000).  
 
THE SPECIAL ROLE OF BANKS 
There is a considerable body of literature discussing the special role of commercial banks in 
the German corporate financing and governance system. Early research on this topic (e.g., 
Cable (1985)) mainly presents the standpoint that banks help to improve governance quality 
and in consequence also company performance. However, recent studies on the German bank-
ing system question this position (Agarwal/Elston (2001)) and also argue that the develop-
ments of the last decade weakened the special role of German banks. (Cf., Dittmann et al. 
(2008))  
To the authors’ opinion the role of German universal banks still differs from the situation in 
the UK or the US in the following aspects: Their role as debt providers in corporate financing 
is more pronounced than in other economies. Moreover German companies still tend to coo-
perate closely with one or a few “house banks” to carry out most of their financial transac-
tions such as the placement of bonds or new stocks, mergers or acquisitions and the raising of 
long term debt. Maybe even more important than this is that banks are still able to exert influ-
ence on publicly listed companies. This influence was not surprising when banks were major 
blockholders in publicly listed companies, but along with regulatory changes their stockhold-
ings in non-banking companies decreased significantly. (Cf. Dittmann et al. (2008)) Yet, their 
representation in terms of supervisory board seats remains almost unimpaired and in our sam-
ple merely 57 percent of the companies have at least one bank representative on their supervi-
sory board. Banks and non-banking listed companies are still interwoven with each other es-
pecially in terms of corporate governance.  
                                                 
2
 Cf. http://www.dai.de/internet/dai/dai-2-0.nsf/dai_publikationen.htm; Access: 12/9/2008 (3:21 p.m.). 
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3. Theoretical Background and Literature 
 
3.1 Reasoning for an impact of governance mechanisms on performance  
 
IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The system of corporate governance can be understood as a set of incentive mechanisms 
which are established and developed to address conflicts of interest between different stake-
holders of a company. Relationships receiving attention by researchers as well as practitioners 
are, e.g., the owner-manager conflict or the owner-lender conflict. Although governance re-
gimes vary among different institutional and legal frameworks such as the common law based 
systems in UK or US and the code law system prevailing in Continental-Europe, there are 
many similarities with respect to the employed governance mechanisms. They comprise, e.g., 
corporate boards, capital structure, compensation schemes or the auditor. All of these ele-
ments more or less interfere with important company decisions. Distinct decisions in turn 
have an impact on company success. Thus, it is likely that corporate governance institutions, 
being relevant factors in shaping the company and determining its activities, show systematic 
interrelations with long-term corporate performance. 
 
THE GENERAL IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS ON PERFORMANCE 
First glimpses on how corporate governance mechanisms might directly affect firm perfor-
mance provide Fich/Slezak (2008). They empirically examine whether variations in the extent 
with which corporate governance mechanisms are used are associated with differences in 
bankruptcy risk. Analyzing a set of financially distressed firms they find that companies with 
properly established and intensely utilized governance instruments show a lower bankruptcy 
risk once they get into financially troublesome situations. This result is intuitive, as one could 
imagine that, e.g., well acting corporate boards whose members are properly incentivized and 
experienced show greater skills and effort in avoiding bankruptcy and company breakdown. 
In difficult and critical economic circumstances governance mechanisms seem to be of impor-
tance, but does this still hold true when a company is not in adverse situations? 
Taking a broader perspective Agarwal/Knoeber (1996) try to assess whether there are syste-
matic effects of different governance mechanisms on corporate success. Using a wide sample 
of listed US companies they examine the governance mechanisms of shareholder structure, 
debt, director independence as well as the markets for corporate control and managerial labor. 
Their results show that several of the mentioned governance mechanisms seem to significant-
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ly influence corporate performance when considered isolated. Applying a simultaneous equa-
tions model they additionally find that in affecting success interdependencies between those 
mechanisms are likely to exist.  
As other studies before and after did Agarwal/Knoeber (1996) report a general statistical as-
sociation between the whole governance structure of companies and their performance. How-
ever many empirical studies focus on presenting their findings and do abstain from providing 
detailed reasoning to explain them. Although these correlations have been obtained regularly 
in empirical research it remains widely unclear which causality is at the bottom of it: do go-
vernance mechanisms affect performance or is their configuration a reaction on corporate 
performance? Admitting that this is not a one-way street but that there are interdependencies 
we argue that it is rather the specification of a governance mechanism that affects perfor-
mance and that repercussions from performance on governance mechanism are second order 
effects. For the purpose of our study we seek to present and discuss reasoning in favor of this 
kind of causality between corporate boards and performance in general and especially for the 
German supervisory board. 
 
THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE BOARDS ON PERFORMANCE 
As mentioned above corporate boards are an important element in the governance system of 
corporations as they play a major role in steering, advising and supervising companies. The-
reby board activity might affect company performance on two ways of transmission: First, 
decisions made in corporate boards are usually related to crucial matters of the companies’ 
daily business or strategy and, thus, directly initiate more or less beneficial business activities. 
Second, monitoring and advice by non-managing directors have a more or less pronounced 
influence on the decisions and actions of managing directors inside and outside the board-
room. This can also be supposed to have an indirect effect on many elements of business ac-
tivity. Taking these aspects into consideration, it not surprises that corporate boards recognize 
undiminished attention by researchers. 
The two aforementioned ways of transmissions are assigned to two different corporate boards 
within the German governance regime: The control of operative business as well as the devel-
opment of underlying tactical and strategic reasoning is assigned to the management board. 
Staffing, supervision and stewardship of the management board are main duties of the super-
visory board, which moreover has to agree upon important decisions such as mergers or major 
investments. Without ignoring the indisputable importance of the management, we concen-
trate our investigation on effects that supervisory boards have on corporate performance. 
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Whereas the impact of managing director activities on corporate performance is rather intui-
tive, it needs to be further illustrated how non-managing, supervisory board directors’ activi-
ties are directly and indirectly connected with corporate performance. We will therefore intro-
duce additional rationale elucidating and underlining the existence of these effects.  
 
DETERMINATION OF THE COMPANY’S RISK-RETURN POSITION 
Taking a general perspective, one could divide the responsibilities between management and 
supervisory board as follows: The management is responsible for bringing up and realizing 
investment projects in order to increase – or put more stringently maximize – the expected 
value of the firm. The sum of all investment projects a company is engaged in determines the 
risk-return-position of the shareholders’ investment.3 Management is incentivized to behave 
in best interest of the shareholders by (the governance mechanism) contracts which amongst 
others include specifically adapted remuneration schemes. However, contracts are imperfect 
and cannot solve agency conflicts completely as they for instance might fail to align different 
time horizons of investors and managers.  
The task of other governance mechanisms in general is to contribute to addressing and further 
mitigating these agency conflicts. In this context the particular function of supervisory boards 
can be classified in the following five components. Firstly, it co-selects, appoints and releases 
the members of the management board including the CEO, thereby strongly influencing a 
company’s management culture. Secondly, members of the supervisory board negotiate with 
managers upon their compensation contracts and the supervisory board is also responsible for 
evaluating the target achievement respectively success of management board members. Third-
ly, the supervisory board may limit the management’s room of maneuver by its right to decide 
on a predefined catalogue of major company decisions. Fourthly, it further limits the available 
options for managerial action by supervising the management’s work itself and by controlling 
the process of external supervision by an auditor. This duty comprises fee-negotiations with 
the auditor, the determination of audit focuses and receipt of the audit report. Auditor selec-
tion is also mainly driven by the supervisory board as it suggests an auditor, which then is 
formally appointed by the general assembly. The fifth and final component of supervisory 
board members’ activity is the exertion of influence as important advisors and consultants of 
the management.  
Based on this and given that the management maximizes the expected firm value by engaging 
in investment projects, the supervisory board can be understand as a mechanism which is able 
                                                 
3
 This risk-return position also affects the expected benefits of other stakeholder groups of the company. 
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to adjust the company’s risk-return-position on behalf of company shareholders as well as 
other stakeholders. It does so by co-determining or limiting the risk taken in managerial in-
vestment projects. This may happen on several ways, e.g.: CEO appointment and dismissal, 
provision of more or less pronounced variable compensation incentives, rejection of venture-
some investment projects or advice and consultancy towards low-risk business activities. 
While these ways limit the risk inherent in investment projects, supervisory board’s determi-
nation of internal and external control primarily addresses fraud risk. The overall extent of 
control emanating from the supervisory board by using own resources or assigning the auditor 
to do so can also be understand as an incentive mechanism to managers. It deters them from 
exploiting company resources for their own benefits (e.g., by earnings management, extensive 
fringe benefits) and from providing fraudulent information.  
Each supervisory board has the aforementioned responsibilities, duties and rights but not all 
of them exercise their rights in the same way or manner. However, different ways of coopera-
tion and collaboration with the management board should differently affect the management’s 
behavior, decisions, actions and, hence, company performance.  
 
INSTITUTIONS, STEADY STATE AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE 
The described ways of transmission are rather indirect than direct. Additionally, transmission 
cannot be observed steadily and permanently as, e.g., a supervisory board may heavily influ-
ence the management in one occasion and not at all in another one. Even CEO activities can-
not be expected to affect corporate performance immediately but its ramifications will be-
come visible in the middle- or long-run. Accordingly repercussions of the more indirect influ-
ence that originates from supervisory board activities will almost always be of long-term na-
ture. Similar arguments and objections can be raised for the impact on performance which 
emanates from other governance mechanisms like capital and ownership structure or the mar-
ket for corporate control. Nevertheless alongside other studies we try to assess the characteris-
tics of these effects empirically without being able to clearly relate a certain governance activ-
ity in the past to a distinct proportion of today’s performance. In order to do so, our empirical 
study and model design are based on another often not explicitly mentioned assumption. This 
assumption constitutes the theoretical link between today’s governance characteristics and 
today’s corporate performance, albeit transmission mechanisms of one in the other rather 
work in the long run. 
Governance mechanisms at large and as such the supervisory board can be considered as in-
stitutions. Once having been established, it is a time-taking transitory process to develop the 
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optimal mode of functioning which goes along with a slight change in the characteristics of 
the institution. This process converges towards a steady-state which is dependent on the envi-
ronment the institution operates in. Modifications of the environment irrespective of their ori-
gin, trigger or dimension take time to be incorporated, as they alter the steady-state to which 
the institution converges. Such environmental shocks might, e.g., be regulatory or personal 
changes. 
Publicly listed companies have to have a supervisory board from the first day of their founda-
tion on. Therefore supervisory board characteristics we can obtain today are the result of a 
development over the past years towards a distinct steady state; they should amongst others 
reflect the specific environment of a company as well as the constellation of individuals act-
ing in and around the company. As company environments vary and as decision makers 
which shape company institutions are divers, different supervisory boards could converge 
towards different steady states. Put differently, the present institutional characteristics are a 
rough but valid indicator for the steady state to which the institution is converging. Given that 
supervisory board activities affect company performance in the long run, then differences in 
board characteristics which drive board activities should have an impact on performance as 
well. Under the assumption that variations in presently observable board characteristics are an 
indicator for different steady states, then these characteristics allow for capturing the real un-
derlying associations between specifics of a governance mechanism and performance. Sum-
ming up this important assumption one can state the following: Governance mechanisms can 
affect performance in the long run, but as individual governance institutions evolve towards a 
local equilibrium, present characteristics of these institutions enable us to assess differences in 
equilibriums and therefore in effects on performance. 
 
Building on this theoretical frame we perform our study which analyzes the influence of su-
pervisory board characteristics on corporate performance. We use specific board characteris-
tics variables that are surrogates for the way with which a distinct supervisory board fulfills its 
tasks. More detailed information on the variables incorporated in our model and how we ex-
pect them to influence corporate performance is given in section 4.2. But first we provide a 
brief overview of the previous literature on which our study settles and which it furthers. 
 
3.2 General Literature Review 
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This study investigates the link between a set of supervisory board characteristics and meas-
ures of firm performance. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyzing the relation 
in a two-tier board system while previous work has exclusively focused on the Anglo-
American one-tier system. Therefore, in setting up our empirical model we can only refer to 
these studies performed within different governance regimes. In the following, we will briefly 
introduce this literature and also show important differences to our approach. 
 
INDEPENDENCE 
Over the past two decades there has been a variety of studies considering the interrelation of 
board characteristics and performance. One of the main issues in these studies has been board 
composition and especially board independence which is an important challenge in the monis-
tic setting. Board composition is typically measured by the proportion of outside directors on 
the board. Outside directors are non-managing directors, not involved in the firm’s operation-
al business. Frequently questioned is if an increased presence of outside directors improves 
firm performance. Although having been widely discussed this question has not finally been 
answered yet. 
Two different dependent variables are most commonly employed to measure the relationship 
between board characteristics like composition and firm performance in the empirical litera-
ture. The first measure is the accounting based return on assets (ROA) which is the ratio of 
the firm’s net income to the book value of the firm’s total assets. The studies of Mehran 
(1995), Klein (1998), and Bhagat/Black (2002) all find no significant relationship between 
accounting measures and board composition. It is generally questionable, if accounting based 
measures are the right proxy for firm performance. Being a backward-looking indicator of the 
firm’s historic activities, these measures seem not to be able to fully proxy for the influence of 
a strategically oriented institution like the board of directors. Therefore empirical studies fre-
quently use market based measures as a second proxy for performance and test for the rela-
tionship between board characteristics and them. Widely used is Tobin’s Q which can be 
found in a couple of different variants but usually aims at relating the market value of the 
firm’s equity to the replacement cost of its tangible assets. Like the accounting based meas-
ures, these market based measures are questionable to fully proxy firm performance and were 
therefore broadly discussed in the literature. The main advantage of market based measures is 
that they better reflect future expectations and incorporate intangible factors such as gover-
nance. 
16 
 
Being one of the initial studies in this field, Hermalin/Weisbach (1991) explore the relation-
ship between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin’s Q for 134 NYSE firms between 
1971 and 1983 and find no significant interrelation. The study of Bhagat/Black (2002) ex-
amines the effect of board composition on market based measures (Tobin’s Q) as well as ac-
counting based measures (ROA and Ratio of sales to assets) for 934 of the largest US firms 
between 1985 and 1995. Similar to Hermalin/Weisbach (1991) they find no significant evi-
dence. Instead they find an insignificant negative association and argue that in contrast to the 
conventional wisdom according to which greater board independence is supposed to improve 
firm performance, it may even impair it. Bhagat/Black (2002) explain this inverse relationship 
with the firm specific knowledge and skills inside directors are bringing to the board as this 
should be of help to make adequate strategic decisions. 
The issue of board independence is different in Germany where the supervisory board is by 
definition a separate institution which is staffed by outside and sometimes grey directors. 
Therefore our study does not control for board independence but closely looks at further cha-
racteristics of an institution which is fairly independent. 
 
SIZE 
Another widely discussed board characteristic which might influences its effectiveness and 
thus firm performance is board size. Small boards could facilitate information- and workflow 
between board members and the management and in that sense improve the board’s effective-
ness. Additionally small boards reduce agency costs by making it more difficult for board 
members to act as free riders. On the other hand large boards could add value by providing a 
broader knowledge base through the increased number of members, processing decisions 
more carefully and speaking more reflective then small boards. In his empirical study Yer-
mack (1996) finds support for the first hypothesis as he detects a significant negative relation-
ship between Tobin’s Q and board size. In contrast to the one-tier governance system, board 
size is regulated in the German two-tier regime. Companies that reach certain thresholds are 
obliged to have a board of a legally defined size. We therefore might yield findings which are 
different to those of prior studies. 
 
DILIGENCE 
The questions whether boards fulfill their duties with differing intensity and whether this has 
an influence on performance have also been discussed in previous literature. Vafeas (1999), 
for example, investigates the relationship between the number of board meetings and the per-
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formance of the firm. He finds that the number of board meetings is increasing with the de-
cline of firm performance. After a period of declining firm performance the number of board 
meetings increases. This improves the firm’s performance. In that sense board meetings are 
reactive rather than proactive tools to changes of firm performance. According to Vafeas 
(1999) the effect of an increased number of board meetings is twofold. On the one hand they 
cause more control of the management, on the other hand they have a positive effect on the 
firm’s operational business. 
 
INCENTIVES 
Directors can only add value to the board, if they are committed to their mandate and this de-
dication can be influenced by appropriate incentives which comprise amongst others reputa-
tion and also monetary stimuli. Yermack (2004) investigates several possible incentives for 
outside directors and finds clear evidence that reputation as well as monetary compensation 
constitute strong incentives for outside director activity. 
The commitment of a director to his monitoring function and also to a specific mandate could 
be measured by the number of other directorships directors hold. The managerial labor market 
provides incentives to directors to gain reputation as an expert monitor (Fama 1980; Fa-
ma/Jensen 1983). This theoretical hypothesis has been tested by a number of recent empirical 
studies and results differ. In their event study Harris/Shimizu (2004) find that overboarded 
directors, defined as directors with more than five other directorships, do not miss more board 
meetings then not overboarded directors and that firms with more overboarded directors tend 
to perform better. In contrast the results of Fich/Shivdasani (2006) show, that firms with a 
majority of busy outside directors, directors who hold three or more directorships, on the 
board perform significantly worse in terms of market-to-book ratio and in terms of operating 
performance. Perry/Payer (2005) find a more differentiated and subtle result. If an outside 
director with prior directorships is added to the board and comes from a firm with high poten-
tial agency problems, proxied by board independence and executive ownership, investor reac-
tion is negative. If, however, the sender-firm’s agency problems are low, the investor reaction 
is positive. The authors argue that under the first circumstances the director has a high mar-
ginal value of time and that the acceptance of the additional directorship can be interpreted as 
a form of perquisite consumption. Under the second condition the benefit from networking 
opportunities, learning or the signaling of managerial quality outweighs the costs of time con-
sumption for an additional directorship. 
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The commitment of a director to his mandate could also be measured by his attendance at 
board meetings. Adams and Ferreira (2008) show in their empirical study, that directors can 
be motivated to attend board meetings with even relatively small incentives. They show for 
US firms, that on average roughly 1.000 USD meeting fee increase the director’s board atten-
dance significantly. This result argues against the standpoint that outside director remunera-
tion is too small compared with overall director income or wealth that they can provide no 
real stimulus for directors.  
Adams/Ferreira (2008) is one study out of a small but growing body of analyses which seek to 
examine effects of outside director remuneration on performance. Cordeiro et al. (2000) ex-
amined a positive relationship between outside director remuneration and earnings per shares 
growth and Lee et al. (2008) find that differences in director remuneration provide incentives 
which affect firm performance. Moreover they show that remuneration differences are sensi-
tive to the governance environment of a corporation.  
Germany law on supervisory board remuneration differs from rules in the US as it prohibits 
the inclusion of stock based components. This regulation influences the nature of feasible 
monetary incentives for outside directors and induces the question whether monetary stimuli 
are effective at all?  
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4. Research design and hypotheses 
 
4.1 Empirical Model 
 
Based on the theoretical considerations and previous literature outlined in Section 3 we set up 
our empirical model. The model is constructed in order to measure effects of intensity and 
quality of governance mechanisms in general and of the supervisory board in particular on 
corporate performance. Thus the general model structure is as follows: 
 
Corporate Performance = f [ Supervisory Board Characteristics, Controls (Governance, 
Management, Company) ] 
 
In the following we introduce the set of employed dependent and independent variables in 
detail. For a brief overview please consider Table 3. 
 
SURROGATES FOR PERFORMANCE 
Corporate performance as well as the goodness or excellence of specific governance mechan-
isms are qualitative constructs and cannot easily be represented in one single, distinct varia-
ble. Therefore we have to find surrogates to quantify both sides of the structural regression 
equation. 
There is a broad variety of potential measures that could be considered as representative for 
specific aspects of overall corporate performance: E.g. company growth in terms of em-
ployees, capital or revenue; company market valuation; the strength to sustain economic cri-
sis; cash flow figures; various kinds of earnings based ratios like earnings per share, return on 
equity, return on assets; absolute earnings or relative ones in comparison to a certain peer 
group etc.. Furthermore the measurement of performance crucially depends on the time frame 
one is looking at. Short- and long-term success can differ at a large scale. Purely focusing on 
past achievements of a firm differs heavily from incorporating the future prospects of a com-
pany. 
Taking a general perspective, one can define corporate performance as the consolidated sum 
of all (immediate or delayed) welfare affecting outcomes of corporate activity for every 
stakeholders of a company. Anyhow, no existing measure completely captures all welfare-
affecting effects of corporate activity. A more functional but by far tighter perspective is that 
corporate performance can be seen as the return shareholders receive on their investment. 
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While the first measure cannot be obtained in a real setting, the latter one leaves many aspects 
of performance out of consideration.  
This brief analysis already points out, that all given measures have shortcomings thus failing 
to depict corporate performance in terms of the above mentioned general understanding. For 
our study we decided to use two surrogates to capture corporate success: Return-on-Assets 
(ROA) and Tobin’s Q. The first is a mainly backward looking, accounting based measure 
which might be as well biased by earnings management. Nevertheless it represents success in 
the form of a monetary based figure which is often used to determine claims of a variety of 
company stakeholders – among these are the management and employees as bonuses are fre-
quently tied to it and shareholders as dividends are commonly set in reaction to annual earn-
ings. The latter measure additionally incorporates market based performance aspects which 
especially account for the expected future development of a company. However, the underly-
ing mechanism of incorporation of those aspects is rather noisy as it for example interferes 
with market trends or improperly specified expectations of market participants due to infor-
mation asymmetries. It also focused on aspects of company performance which mainly bene-
fit shareholders.  
The approach to use more than one performance measure might yield systematically different 
result, which would at best allow for interpretation and further insights in the underlying dy-
namics. 
 
SURROGATES FOR SUPERVISORY BOARD ACTIVITY 
In order to obtain performance effects of beneficial supervisory board activity we need to find 
board characteristics which capture certain aspects of beneficial activities. Prior research in-
troduced the term of board quality and considers high quality boards to positively affect the 
company. In the early 1990s researchers and practitioners brought forward specific characte-
ristics which reflect this quality. According to Lipton/Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) impor-
tant aspects to assess the quality of a board are its size and structure as well as the indepen-
dence and diligence of its members. Subsequent research supplemented this list by adding the 
aspects of board member expertise and busyness. 
Starting from this point we have to adapt that classification to the specifics of the German 
governance regime. First of all, independence is a completely different issue compared to the 
situation in one-tier systems. Supervisory board directors all have to be non-executives of that 
very same company by definition; moreover the fact that former CEOs might be board chair-
man should not make them puppets of the present management board. We thus argue that 
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independence is only a minor issue in the German setting and therefore do not include specific 
variables to address this aspect. Unless not considering independence, we pay attention to the 
other aspects brought up by previous literature and listed above. We additionally include va-
riables which explicitly point on aspects of compensation incentives for supervisory board 
members. In summary, we classify supervisory board characteristics in these four categories 
structure, diligence, expertise and incentives.  
Variables addressing structural aspects comprise a variable for board size (MEMB) as well as 
two binary variables which indicate the existence of an audit committee (AC) and a compen-
sation committee (CC). To proxy for the expertise of board members, we include BANK 
which measures the presence of bank representatives on the board.4 Besides acting on behalf 
of the bank, bankers are also expected to possess financial expertise. Furthermore we include 
the variable MAND which is calculated as average number of other supervisory board man-
dates per board member5 and expect this variable to proxy for the overall busyness as well as 
experience and consequently expertise of the board members on a distinct board. The dili-
gence of board members in terms of time invested into the mandate is supposed to be roughly 
approximated by the number of meetings in a respective fiscal year (MEET). Finally we seek 
to assess whether monetary incentives for supervisory board members have an effect on per-
formance. Our model design accounts for this by introducing two compensation variables into 
the model: the fraction of variable to total compensation (Supervisory Board Compensation 
Ratio: SBCRatio) and the average compensation of board members (Supervisory Board Com-
pensation Average: SBCAvg). 
 
CONTROLS 
As supervisory board characteristics can at best explain a part of the overall company perfor-
mance our model incorporates variables which control for other aspects which might influ-
ence corporate performance.  
The first group of controls accounts for company characteristics. We do not include a variable 
which purely accounts for company size as both dependent variables are size adjusted ratios, 
i.e. they are calculated by including a measure of company size. Yet we include the natural 
logarithm of the total number of a company’s subsidiaries (LnSUB) assuming that this varia-
ble can absorb potential effects of complexity on performance beyond corporate size. Ac-
                                                 
4
 In sensitivity analyses we also run estimations including the absolute number of bank representatives. This 
variable however turned out to be size related as if at all only larger boards turned out to have more than one 
rank fellow. Moreover we don’t expect a linear relation with performance when including more bank delegates. 
5
 Mandates as non-executive director in boards of directors are treated as supervisory board mandate. The meas-
ure is the average number of mandates for all directors and includes mandates of workforce representatives. 
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counting based leverage (LEV) is included as basic control for effects of corporate financing 
and capital structure on performance. Industry dummies, which are in accordance to the Ger-
man stock exchange classification, complete the set of company control variables.  
The second group of controls consists of variables which reflect managerial (especially CEO) 
incentives and experience which might as well affect company performance. CEOTenure 
might has an effect on performance as a CEO with comparatively long tenure has proved to 
be successful and has had time to modulate the company according to his own vision which 
could reflect in performance. The binary variable CEOChange indicates the replacement of an 
old CEO by a new one. This proxy is implemented as we particularly want to check for the 
effects of a potential “Big-Bath-Accounting” a new CEO has taken over control. Finally we 
include a measure to control for potentially performance affecting managerial compensation 
incentives (MCRatio); the variable is calculated as the ratio of variable to total annual man-
agement compensation. 
 
Variables Explanation 
ROA Return on Assets (Operative Income / Assets) 
Tobin's Q (Market value of equity + book value of liabilities) / book value of total assets 
LnSUB Natural logarithm of the number of overall subsidiaries 
LEV Liabilities divided by total assets 
CEOTenure Tenure of the present CEO (in full years) 
CEOChange Binary variable; 1 if CEO has changed in the corresponding fiscal year 
MCRatio Sum of variable management compensation / sum of total management compensation 
MEMB Number of members on the supervisory board 
MEET Number of supervisory board meetings in the fiscal year 
MAND Average number of other mandates of supervisory board members 
SBCRatio Total variable supervisory board compensation / Total supervisory board compensation 
SBCAvg Average compensation per supervisory board member 
BANK Binary variable; 1 if at least one bank representative is on the supervisory board 
AC Binary variable; 1 if supervisory board has set up an audit committee 
CC Binary variable; 1 if supervisory board has set up a compensation committee 
 
Table 3: Variable Descriptions 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
 
The subsequently introduced hypotheses are based on the assumption, that characteristics of 
the supervisory board could have an effect on firm performance in terms of market or ac-
counting based measures. Settling on the arguments presented by Hermalin/Weisbach (2003) 
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we presume the following economic reasoning by which supervisory board features may af-
fect corporate performance. Without doubt, company performance is affected by the actions 
of the executive management. Its actions are in turn affected by the work of the supervisory 
board which is set up to advice and supervise the management directors. As we can hardly 
capture these actions by quantifiable variables within a cross sectional data set, we have to 
employ feasible surrogates for them. Board characteristics are such surrogates. 
 
BOARD COMPENSATION 
The work of supervisory board members is likely to be influenced by provided incentives 
which can be either monetary or nonmonetary. One could argue that nonmonetary incentives 
like reputation should be the more important category as monetary incentives are rather small 
compared to the overall income of average supervisory board members. Nevertheless, Cordei-
ro et al. (2000) examine the relevance of monetary incentives and the results provide first 
glimpses on the existence of an impact that outside director compensation might has on per-
formance. Supplementary, Yermack (2004) finds that both reputation and remuneration of 
outside directors can be supposed to constitute remarkable incentives for directors. Recent 
studies further emphasize that characteristics of monetary incentives are governance characte-
ristics and seem to affect corporate performance. Lee et al. (2008) find evidence that compen-
sation differences among outside directors vary together with other governance mechanisms 
and contribute to explaining differences in corporate performance. 
Adams/Ferreira (2008) examine board meeting attendance fees and find that these have a sig-
nificantly positive effect on the participation ratio of directors. This is noteworthy as atten-
dance fees are at a particularly low level, roughly averaging 1.000 $ per meeting and director. 
In order to explain this finding Adams/Ferreira (2008) argue that attendance fees do not only 
and primarily serve as monetary incentive. Instead they could also function as a signal which 
is clearly perceived by outside directors indicating that attendance is expected and a natural 
part of supervisory board culture and work ethics. Not acting in accordance with established 
and “signaled” board culture might result in adverse effects on a respective directors’ reputa-
tion. This suggested close link between outside directors’ monetary incentive structure and 
reputation adds a new perspective in order to explain the functioning of respective stimuli.  
With a median value of 47,000 Euro per year mean supervisory board member compensation 
in Germany can arguably also be considered small in comparison with overall director income 
or wealth. Additionally the components of supervisory board compensation differ from those 
allowed in other legal environments as stock based elements are prohibited. This regulation 
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alters the nature of monetary incentives for German directors and directly raises the question 
whether monetary stimuli can still induce favorable director activity as recent studies with US 
data suggest.  
For the purpose of our analysis the mentioned previous results jointly indicate at least that 
even small monetary incentives for board members could have an effect on directors’ beha-
vior and that properly set monetary incentives do affect director activity and thereby corporate 
performance. Despite the differences in regulatory environment we still expect these incen-
tives to affect board member actions which in turn should reflect in corporate performance. 
We try to separately capture the effects of amount and structure of monetary incentives by 
using two variables: The average total compensation per board member and the ratio of varia-
ble to total compensation. Concerning these variables we hypothesize: 
 
H1: Higher average compensation and a higher fraction of variable to total compensation 
have a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
BOARD STRUCTURE 
Activities of the supervisory board are also affected by other factors which influence the style 
and efficiency of its work, especially by those factors which may interfere with the ability of 
certain board members or the board as a whole to perform its duties properly. As already men-
tioned in sections 2 and 3.1 there are several tasks which the supervisory board has to cope 
with. The complexity and constant process of change within companies even additionally 
raise the bar for board members. Thus the structure of a board, which can partly be deter-
mined by the board itself, can play an important role in either helping or handicapping the 
supervisory board and its members in fulfilling their duties. 
One structural factor that remains in the discretion of each board is the establishment of com-
mittees that are responsible for working on specific issues for instance by preparing and 
bringing up proposals concerning certain decision problems the supervisory board faces. Be-
sides, committees offer board members an opportunity to qualify themselves as experts for 
certain issues such as auditing or compensation. Beyond that, committee membership fre-
quently is compensated and each committee has its own chairman – a position which might 
qualify it’s possessor for further future responsibilities. Taken together, this implies that repu-
tational incentives arise by setting up committees. This may in turn attract high quality board 
members and provides additional stimuli to current directors to exercise their mandate proper-
ly.  
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Although the German Corporate Governance Code recommends the establishment of appro-
priate committees, boards can easily decide not to set them up without facing direct conse-
quences.6 We thus presume this decision not to be accidental but intentional or even strategic 
and hence expect boards which structure themselves by introducing certain committees, given 
all else remains equal, to be better capable to act in favor of the company’s success. 
A second aspect of board structure is its size. Supervisory boards include representatives of 
major company stakeholders. They are also supposed to comprise directors which are able to 
execute the various roles and challenging responsibilities it is confronted with. Too few mem-
bers on the board might come along with the problem of underrepresentation of important 
interests, standpoints and perspectives. Too small boards are also more likely to lack the ex-
pertise and experience needed for a certain task or situation. However, prior literature refers to 
problems which are associated with oversized boards and even provides evidence for adverse 
effects on corporate performance. (Cf., e.g., Yermack (1996)) Too many experienced, expert 
directors who represent too many different interests and opinions in a process which evolves 
towards a rather democratic decision finding may significantly hamper board efficiency and 
thereby corporate success.  
Anyway, we don’t believe this reasoning to hold true in the German setting. First, manage-
ment’s daily business and decision making processes should not be affected by the number of 
directors on the supervisory board as it is separated from the management board. Second and 
even more striking is the fact that board size is to a large extent prescribed by law as the min-
imum number of directors closely depends on the size of the company. Our data suggests that 
empirically the prescribed minimum board size is not exceeded7 which implies that the num-
ber of supervisory board directors in a certain company is not the result of optimization con-
siderations but a merely regulatory prescription which has to be followed. We therefore don’t 
expect this aspect to show a significant impact on corporate performance. 
Consequently we hypothesize the following for aspects of board structure: 
 
H2: The existence of board committees positively affects corporate performance whereas 
board size does not at all. 
 
                                                 
6
 Our data shows that a considerable number of companies do not have audit committees and even more don’t 
have compensation committees; the variation in these variables implies that they could potentially carry explana-
tory power and the correlation between which is far away for being perfect indicates that they do not explain the 
very same phenomenon. 
7
 Another observation which underlining this is that companies who recently changed their legal form from the 
German AG into the European SE (e.g., BASF, Fresenius) almost immediately decreased the number of directors 
from 20 to 12 which is the minimum required for SEs by European law.  
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BOARD DILIGENCE 
The eagerness and effort, the preciseness and scrupulousness, the accuracy and carefulness 
with which single directors and the board as a whole execute their task all can be considered 
to contributing to and being aspects of the term diligence. From this perspective it seems ap-
pealing to expect an impact of diligence on supervisory board activities and thereby on corpo-
rate performance. Amongst others, diligence could affect board activities and performance on 
these ways: First, diligent directors should be able to better consult the management and to 
more accurately interfere with management decisions. Second, diligent board member work 
can also serve as a signal towards management conveying the information that neglectful or 
self-serving work as well as fraud will most likely be detected by the supervisory board and 
lead to adverse consequences for the management. 
We employ the number of board meetings as rough proxy for board diligence with respect to 
the time spent by directors on preparing for and sitting in board meeting, albeit we have to 
admit that this variable cannot fully capture the above mentioned aspects associated with the 
term diligence. Another caveat has to be mentioned: the number of board meeting is also part-
ly determined by law as a minimum of two meeting per six month is mandatory. However 
companies frequently exceed this minimum level which indicates that meeting frequency is 
freely chosen by at least a considerable number of companies. Taken together, we still expect 
the number of board meetings to be an indicator for the involvement of the supervisory board 
in decisions affecting company future prospects and performance and thus hypothesize: 
 
H3: Diligent work of the supervisory board in terms of number of meetings positively affects 
firm performance. 
 
BOARD QUALIFICATION 
As already mentioned supervisory boards are confronted with various different duties and 
responsibilities requiring directors to be able to understand the complex situation and envi-
ronment a company faces. Already difficult for company internal protagonists, this becomes 
an even more challenging task for outside directors on a supervisory board. In assessing 
whether a respective board should be able to better cope with these challenges than another, 
one could try to infer the qualification of the board, i.e. the conjoint qualifications of all board 
members. Qualification again is a multidimensional concept but it arguably entails the aspects 
of experience and expertise.  
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The transmission of experience and expertise into beneficial, performance increasing influ-
ence might happen as follows: On the one hand, the influence of supervisory board members 
on the management depends on their ability to establish themselves within the frequent inte-
ractions with management. Moreover the influence will be more pronounced, when directors 
can represent opinions out of their own professional experiences and when a director 
represents an expert standpoint. On the other hand, given that supervisory boards possess an 
influence then experienced and expert boards can be supposed to have a more favorable one 
than inexperienced, incapable groups of directors. More experienced board members should 
be able to more adequately react in difficult situations as they might already have experienced 
a similar situation during their career. Certain professional skills of board members may also 
be advantageous when facing difficult circumstances and making tough decisions. Distin-
guished expertise in relevant areas will arguably be a part of the professional skills required to 
contribute beneficially in those situations. 
Besides measuring whether there are financially skilled bank representatives on the board we 
employ the average number of further mandates directors of a specific board hold. This type 
of variable has received considerable attention in recent literature as researchers have dis-
cussed that it not only measures experience but also the busyness of directors. If directors are 
to busy they can be distracted from properly fulfilling their monitoring function although their 
other mandates provide them with experience. Fich/Shivdasani (2006) find evidence that 
more than three mandates have negative performance effects whereas Ferris et al. (2003) do 
not observe adverse such an adverse relationship. 
While previous literature remains undecided which effect prevails, we adhere to the potential 
positive effects of experience and expertise on performance and hypothesize:  
 
H4: More experienced supervisors on the boards as well as the presence of experts positively 
affect firm performance. 
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5. Data & Results 
 
5.1 Data Set 
 
SAMPLE 
Our initial sample is based on company data of all German companies that were publicly 
listed in one of the four major indices of the German stock exchange (Deutsche Börse) DAX, 
MDAX, SDAX or TecDAX at the end of December 2007. Of these 160 companies we col-
lected data for the years 2006 and 2007. Due to missing data and companies with headquar-
ters not located in Germany and thus not being obliged to follow German regulation especial-
ly with respect to the governance regime we had to exclude firm years. Our final sample in-
cludes 266 firm year observations. 
Currently there exists no complete database with all the information necessary for our study. 
Therefore our data sources are heterogeneous. Balance sheet and P&L data are from DAFNE 
and Hoppenstedt database. Governance data and other board characteristics where hand-
collected from the companies’ annual statements or the companies’ homepage. Data on 
CEO’s age and tenure was as far as not being on-hand in the companies’ annual reports hand-
collected from executive databases, CVs and also from press releases available on the inter-
net.  
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for both the dependent and independent variables em-
ployed in our study. Please note that we report descriptive for all variables before being trans-
formed into the format used in the models in order to fulfill statistical prerequisites of the 
OLS methodology.  
The average company in our sample has about 135 subsidiaries indicating that we examine 
rather large companies. These companies possess a mean leverage of 62 percent. Present 
CEOs are in office slightly less than six years albeit the standard deviation is rather high sug-
gesting that there are many CEOs with either shorter or longer tenure. The CEO Change vari-
able supports this as it indicates that 17 percent of the companies replace their CEO in a re-
spective firm year of our sample. Some basic figures for supervisory board characteristics 
reveal that an average board entails ca. 11 members which meet between five and six times 
per year. Average supervisory board members hold 2.2 further board seats. 79 percent of the 
supervisory boards have an audit 69 percent a compensation committee in a respective firm 
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year. Remarkably, 57 percent of the companies have at least one banker on their supervisory 
board which is far beyond their blockholder activity in major German companies. (Cf. Ditt-
mann et al. (2008)) 
Considering board compensation the figures show that directors earn a mean of 64,013 Euros 
and receive about 30 percent of their remuneration on a variable basis. Of further interest is 
the considerable variation in our compensation variables with compensation per member 
ranging from 4,374 to 431,111 Euros and variable payment components to vary between zero 
and 96.4 percent among supervisory board in our sample. 
 
Variables N Mean Std.dev Median Min Max 
ROA 288 0.055 0.077 0.045 -0.239 0.611 
Tobin's Q 287 1.720 1.120 1.385 0.637 11.228 
SUB 283 134.740 239.898 51 2 1,998 
LEV 288 0.620 0.189 0.633 0.092 0.985 
CEOTenure 283 5.900 4.760 5 0 23 
CEOChange 283 0.170 0.379 0 0 1 
MCRatio 274 0.516 0.184 0.541 0.000 0.880 
MEMB 288 11.220 5.880 12 3 21 
MEET 286 5.530 1.906 5 3 14 
MAND 273 2.205 1.027 2.200 0 6 
SBCRatio 269 0.315 0.301 0.322 0.000 0.964 
SBCAvg 285 64,013 56,312 47,083 4,375 431,111 
BANK 288 0.570 0.496 1 0 1 
AC 288 0.790 0.409 1 0 1 
CC 288 0.690 0.461 1 0 1 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5 lists correlations between all employed variables. The data reveals a couple of signifi-
cant correlations between the independent variables. Whereas the absolute values of several 
figures are in the range between 0.3 and 0.5 there are only two pair wise correlations above 
0.5. Namely AC (Audit Committee) and CC (Compensation Committee) are highly but far 
away from perfectly positively correlated. Moreover there is a high positive correlation be-
tween the number of subs and of members on the board. This can be explained as there is a 
size aspect inherent in the number of subsidiaries a corporation has and size is the regulatory 
determinant of board member quantity. The number of board members in general shows sig-
nificant correlations with many variables but none of them indicates severe multicollinearity. 
The supervisory board compensation variables possess only low correlation levels with other 
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board characteristics and are amongst each other correlated fairly below 0.5. ROA and To-
bin’s Q also show a significant correlation of 0.485 which indicates that there is some varia-
tion between both measures and that they are not just two sides of the same coin.  
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ROA 1
0,485 
***
-0.105
-0,526
***
-0,062
0,201
***
0,131
**
-0,125
**
-0.102 0.012
0,195
***
0,122
**
-0,106
-0,216
***
-0.099
Tobin's Q . 1
-0,260
***
-0,441
***
0.106 -0.096 0.005
-0,300
***
0.031 -0.116 -0.036 0.053
-0,216
***
-0,269
***
-0,123
**
LnSUB . . 1
0,378
***
-0.023 0.037
0,378
***
0,597
***
-0.051 -0.008
0,317
***
0,415
***
0,357
***
0,297
***
0,277
***
LEV . . . 1 -0.103 0,080 0.067
0,411
***
0.019 0.049 0.054 0.113
0,352
***
0,227
***
0,129
***
CEOTenure . . . . 1
-0,487
***
-0.038 -0.039
-0,178
***
-0.078 -0.008 -0.092 -0.097
-0,141
**
-0.089
CEOChange . . . . . 1 0.007 -0.007 0.112 -0.048 -0.055 -0.022 -0.007 0,020 0.055
MCRatio . . . . . . 1
0,266
***
-0.018 0.026
0,395
***
0,252
***
0,271
***
-0.002
0,140
**
MEMB . . . . . . . 1 0.009 -0.071
-0,299
***
0,349
***
0,474
***
0,472
***
0,408
***
MEET . . . . . . . . 1 -0.039 -0.111 0.088 -0.041 0.046 0.058
MAND . . . . . . . . . 1 0.026 0.109
0,140
**
-0.037 -0.076
SBCRatio . . . . . . . . . . 1
0,418
***
0,177
***
0,190
***
0,220
***
SBCAvg . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0,175
***
0,217
***
0,192
***
BANK . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0,274
***
0,174
***
AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0,523
***
CC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
5.2 Results of multivariate regressions 
 
Table 6 contains OLS regression results with ROA as dependent variable and table 7 shows 
the same for Tobin’s Q. Both tables comprise estimation results of model specifications with 
and without including industry dummies. Although there are some slight differences among 
the results for ROA and Tobin’s Q, the main findings persist irrespective of the employed 
performance measure. The goodness of fit of all models is at a considerably high level com-
pared with prior research. The ROA model is capable to explain 38 percent of the dependent 
variable’s variation without including industry dummies respectively 45 percent after includ-
ing them. Adjusted R2 for the Tobin’s Q models is lower but still at 0.248 and 0.230.  
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  Dependent Variable   
Independent Variables
 
ROA
 
LnSUB
 
-0,101
 
 
 
0,014
 
 
 
LEV
 
-0,550
 
***
 
-0,698
 
***
 
CEOTenure
 
0,112
 
*
 
0,050
 
 
 
CEOChange
 
0,051
 
 
 
0,002
 
 
 
MCRatio
 
0,162
 
***
 
0,055
 
 
 
MEMB
 
0,112
 
 
 
0,201
 
**
 
MEET
 
-0,096
 
*
 
-0,096
 
 
 
MAND
 
0,017
 
 
 
-0,064
 
 
 
SBCRatio
 
0,062
 
 
 
0,037
 
 
 
SBCAvg
 
0,175
 
***
 
0,177
 
***
 
BANK
 
0,031
 
 
 
-0,120
 
*
 
AC
 
-0,108
 
*
 
-0,128
 
*
 
CC
 
-0,031
 
 
 
0,056
 
 
 
Industries     Included 
Adj R² 0,382   0,465   
Obs 240   240   
 
Table 6: Regression results ROA 
 
Considering the set of control variables our analysis yields the following results which are 
relatively stable across our model specifications: There seems to be no significant effect of 
company complexity in terms of number of subsidiaries on corporate performance. We also 
do not find significant evidence for a systematic influence of the change of a CEO on corpo-
rate performance. This speaks against the existence of Big-Bath accounting practices in Ger-
many at least among our sample firms and in the sample period. Only very vague support can 
be found for the structure of executive compensation and for an influence of the CEO tenure 
(and thus experience in the company)8 on performance. There is however a very strong rela-
tionship between the leverage of a company and its performance. Highly leveraged corpora-
tions show both a lower market based as well as accounting based corporate performance. 
This finding might be explained by the fact that too high leverage is often a sign for adverse 
                                                 
8
 We also tried the CEO age as a control variable for overall experience and found no influence either. Both 
variables are highly correlated and we decided to include tenure as it seems to better capture experience in a 
respective company. 
32 
 
economic circumstances which are usually followed by lower accounting profits and market 
valuation. Only some of the controls for industry specific effects turn out to be significant: 
Media (ROA and Tobin’s Q), Banking, Chemical, Financial and Technology (all for ROA 
only) seem to be the industries with significantly different performance patterns, while other 
industries do not seem to be characterized by systematical effects. 
 
  Dependent Variable   
Independent Variables
 
Tobin’s Q
 
LnSUB
 
-0,104
 
 
 
-0,093
 
 
 
LEV
 
-0,329
 
***
 
-0,330
 
***
 
CEOTenure 
 
0,028
 
 
 
0,031
 
 
 
CEOChange
 
-0,042
 
 
 
-0,047
 
 
 
MCRatio
 
0,063
 
 
 
0,008
 
 
 
MEMB
 
-0,095
 
 
 
-0,036
 
 
 
MEET
 
0,001
 
 
 
0,012
 
 
 
MAND
 
-0,019
 
**
 
-0,113
 
*
 
SBCRatio
 
-0,032
 
 
 
-0,043
 
 
 
SBCAvg
 
0,239
 
***
 
0,273
 
***
 
BANK
 
-0,030
 
 
 
-0,044
 
 
 
AC
 
-0,157
 
**
 
-0,175
 
**
 
CC
 
0,028
 
 
 
0,004
 
 
 
Industries     Included 
Adj R² 0,248   0,230   
Obs 239   239   
 
Table 7: Regression results Tobin’s Q 
 
BOARD COMPENSATION 
Supervisory board compensation incentives were hypothesized to have a positive effect on 
performance. While the structure of remuneration seems to have no statistically significant 
interrelation with performance the average compensation level per director turns out to heavi-
ly and consistently affect corporate performance. Companies which pay their supervisory 
board directors higher average salaries seem to be more successful. Based on the presented 
reasoning in sections 4.2 and 3.1, we argue that the provided monetary incentives are not too 
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small to be answered by higher quality of the board’s work which translates into favorable 
influence on corporate activity and performance with the director compensation level serving 
as signal well-perceived by directors.  
One might argue that the statistical relation holds true but with causality the other way 
around: Successful companies pay their supervisory board directors more as they can afford 
and also as the overall compensation rises with increasing variable components due to high 
profitability. We disagree for at least two reasons: First, profitable companies are not neces-
sarily big ones which can easily afford to pay a higher average salary to supervisory board 
directors. Moreover, given the data compensation still is at a low level and can thus be af-
forded not only by profitable companies. Second, our data provides clear evidence that the 
interrelation between average compensation and performance is not caused by the amount of 
variable compensation in case of high corporate profitability – the fraction of variable to total 
supervisory board compensation (SBCRatio) shows no significant effect and has even a nega-
tive interrelation in the Tobin’s Q model specification. 
We thus argue that the supervisory board compensation level is a characteristic that has de-
veloped over time and represents the willingness of a company to incentivize and compensate 
high quality board work in order to positively affect its overall performance. Thus, our results 
support the first part of H1. 
 
BOARD STRUCTURE 
With respect to board structure our analysis yields on the one hand that board size does not 
seem to systematically affect corporate performance as the corresponding estimators turn out 
to be significantly positive only once at the five percent level within the ROA regression in-
cluding industries. The association with Tobin’s Q is negative albeit insignificant. Differing 
from findings of studies in other Governance regimes this result is in line with our expectation 
formulated in H2 which was based on the strict regulation of board size in Germany.  
On the other hand we find surprising results for the impact of board committees. Compensa-
tion committees do not seem to be systematically interfering with performance while the exis-
tence of an audit committee is negatively associated with both, Tobin’s Q and ROA. The cor-
responding estimators may only be significant at the five or ten percent level but they consis-
tently turn out to have a statistical influence across all model specifications. Interestingly our 
finding for the German market in the years 2006 and 2007 to some extent corresponds to re-
cent findings in the American context. Brown/Caylor (2009) analyze correlations between 
different measures of performance and 51 aspects of good corporate governance using a data 
34 
 
set from 2002 resp. 2003. In a former working paper version (Brown/Caylor (2004)) they also 
report negative statistical associations between firm operative performance and aspects which 
are said to represent good governance in terms of auditing.  
One explanation particularly for our result can be derived from reasoning presented in section 
3.1. Assuming that supervisory board activity amongst others limits the risk exposure of a 
company one can expect that intensely supervised companies incur lower losses in adverse 
economic periods but also lower profits in boom periods. 2006 and 2007 have been such years 
of prosperity for German stock companies. Given the existence of an audit committee is a 
proxy for thorough supervision our results might reflect the performance effects of limited 
risk during the recent boom. If this holds true we should find the opposite, i.e. a positive per-
formance effect of audit committees, for recession years. 
Taken together we do only find support for the second part of H2 and have to reject the first 
part, finding evidence for the opposite impact of board committees on corporate performance. 
 
BOARD DILIGENCE 
In our hypotheses development we considered higher diligence of the supervisory board to 
positively affect performance. Our results however show only a slightly significant negative 
impact on ROA in the specification without industries and a faint insignificant positive rela-
tion with Tobin’s Q. These findings cannot support H3 and additionally there is no substantial 
evidence for an effect of board diligence on performance at least in our sample. This result 
does not unanimously suggest that diligence does not affect performance at all. It could also 
be due to the employed independent variable which may not be a perfect proxy for diligence. 
A few meetings more than minimally required by law can be representative for diligent, per-
formance increasing board activity but in contrast to that a very high number of meetings ra-
ther occur when economic circumstances are difficult or when the company is in financial 
distress – both situations are likely to be associated with bad corporate performance. 
 
BOARD QUALIFICATION 
Our results for the impact of board expertise on corporate performance are ambiguous. The 
average amount of board mandates does not significantly affect the ROA of companies in our 
sample but it is significantly negatively related to their Tobin’s Q. This suggests that a com-
pany whose board consists of busy directors that on average serve on many other boards suf-
fer an adverse effect on their market based performance while it does interfere with the bal-
ance sheet figures based performance. At a first glance this finding is in contrast to the reason-
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ing of beneficial performance effects by enhanced director experience and expertise outlined 
in sections 3.1 and 4.2. Being more cautious in interpreting this result, we argue that it rather 
provides evidence for the existence of adverse performance effects by too busy outside direc-
tors which outweigh the positive effects of increased experience at least in the perception of 
stock market participants. However we do not want to push the interpretation of these results 
too far especially in the light of the analysis by Perry/Peyer (2005) which draws a light on the 
complex and subtle nature of interactions between board mandates and corporate performance 
in the US setting. Amongst others this relation can be subject to the extent of agency conflicts 
or specifics of the companies in which a director attends a board – most of these aspects are 
not easily accessible data for German companies. 
The second facet for board qualification in our study is the presence of bank representatives in 
a supervisory board. In three of four model specifications the respective estimator indicates a 
negative association but only in one of them it turns out to be significant at the ten percent 
level (ROA with industries included). Although being not overwhelmingly solid, these find-
ings still support the results of a recent study by Dittmann et al. (2008), which examine a dis-
advantageous influence of bankers in German supervisory boards on corporate success. 
Taken together our findings do not support H4 and even partly provide evidence for a nega-
tive effect of the employed measures of expertise and experience on corporate performance. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study is one of the first attempts to analyze interactions between corporate boards and 
performance in Germany empirically. Our results reveal that there are significant interdepen-
dencies. The average supervisory board director compensation is consistently interrelated with 
market as well as accounting based performance measures. This supports the idea that com-
pensation can function as a signal towards outside directors stimulating intense and proper 
work in and outside the boardroom. Moreover we find busy directors and the presence of 
bank representatives to have a negative impact on corporate performance – results which sup-
port recent findings. Interestingly the existence of an audit committee shows to be negatively 
related to corporate performance. Assuming that this variable is an explicit indicator for su-
pervision by the supervisory board, this might be explained as follows: Enhanced control lim-
its the risk position of a company and narrows the room of maneuver for the management. 
This can lead to comparatively lower corporate performance in boom periods like 2006 and 
2007 but should also be associated with superior performance in economic downturns. Future 
research with panel data over the curse of economic cycles may deepen our understanding of 
these processes. But our results also suggest that findings of studies within one-tier systems 
cannot be assumed to automatically hold within the two-tier regime. This aspect is especially 
documented in our results for board size and meetings as both do not turn out to be signifi-
cantly related with performance. 
Besides yielding empirical results we also wanted to establish a theoretical frame which furth-
ers the understanding of transmission mechanisms between board characteristics and corpo-
rate performance and allows for better interpretation empirically obtained findings. In order to 
do so we adopted the theoretical reasoning provided by Hermalin/ Weisbach (2003) on the 
specifics of the two tier system. Thereupon we developed a classification of supervisory board 
activities which may directly or indirectly affect corporate performance and brought up eco-
nomic reasoning to backup these effects as well as examples which cast light on a couple of 
detailed ways of transmission. The main goal of this part of the study is to enrich and contri-
bute to the discussion on causality between governance instruments and performance. We 
might as well be able to add a new perspective as our explanations focuses on the role and 
responsibilities of the supervisory board. 
Taken together this paper might be a starting point for research on the impact of governance 
mechanisms on performance in Germany. We are convinced that further studies in this field 
of research can bring up interesting insights and findings which supplement the governance 
research carried out in one-tier environments. 
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Of cause this study is subject to some caveats. First of all we do not have panel data which 
would allow for further analyses to for example work on the issue of endogeneity with distin-
guished statistical means. The German capital market is rather small and so is our sample. But 
these issues can be resolved by future research which should be able to settle on a wider sam-
ple which covers a longer period. We also have to admit that some of the employed variables 
may not always perfectly capture the aspects of supervisory boards we theoretically wanted to 
measure. Future studies should be able to obtain additional variables and also further controls 
as scientific databases are likely to start gathering and providing newly accessible German 
data. 
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